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The problems of both classical and modern theory of knowledge, according 
to Popper, reside in the problem of demarcation: a problem closely re­
lated to the problem of induction. The paper argues the view that 
Popper's view of metaphysics is ambiguous, requiring another criterion 
to distinguish between "good" and "bad " metaphysics. The sources of 
the problem are pinpointed, and Popper's distinction between three types 
of theory outlined. The article then explores the distinction between 
types of theories and the issues of falsification, testability and refutation, 
before going on to a consideration of the relationship between science 
and metaphysics, and weighing up the issue of good anc <id metaphysics. 
From this emerges clearly that the second "criterion ot demarcation" is 
needed to make precisely this distinction; also in view of Popper's un­
clear, even ambiguous, view of metaphysics.
THE "PR O BLEM " OF DEM ARCATION
Popper claims that the problems of both classical and modern theory of 
knowledge can be traced back to the problem of demarcation, i.e. "to the 
problem of finding the criterion of the empirical character of science". 
He claims that the problem concerning the demarcation between science 
and pseudo-science is closely related to the problem of induction 
(1968:91,92). Scientists and philosophers believed in induction because
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they thought that it was the method of induction which functioned as the 
criterion between science and non-science. They thought that if induction 
were given up, the scientific community would have to give up the claim 
that science, by its method, is superior to non-science, e.g. 
metaphysics. Popper does not believe that induction provides such a 
criterion of demarcation between science and metaphysics and attempts 
to formulate one which would make it possible to distinguish between the 
empirical sciences on the one hand and mathematics and logic as well as 
"metaphysical systems" on the other. This he calls the problem of de­
marcation.
It will be argued in this paper that Popper's view of metaphysics is am­
biguous and that this ambiguity requires a modification or at least re­
formulation of his argument in favour of a criterion of demarcation 
between science and metaphysics. The ambiguity becomes evident when 
Popper's own philosophy is subjected to reflexive criticism. In terms of 
his criterion of demarcation his philosophy cannot be regarded as "sc i­
ence". So it must be seen as an "acceptable type of metaphysics". The 
question is then on which grounds are we required to assume that his 
"metaphysics" is not of the bewitching and confusing kind? Presumably 
Popper would argue that his arguments are open to rational criticism and 
therefore not vulnerable in the same sense as metaphysics. Yet, it is clear 
that the proposed criterion of demarcation will have to be modified or 
supplemented by another criterion which would make it possible to d is ­
tinguish between "good" and "bad" metaphysics.
SO URCES OF THE PROBLEM
According to Popper three main sources gave rise to the problem of de­
marcation: the problem of induction (Hume's problem); the verifiability 
criterion of meaning as suggested by logical positivism (especially 
Carnap), which proposed that "meaning" was the criterion which ought 
to be applied to statements in order to distinguish between their scientific 
or metaphysical character; and the problems posed by so-called 
pseudo-scientific systems such as Marxism, psycho-analysis (Freud) and 
individual psychology (Adler). These pseudo-scientific systems appeared 
to possess extraordinary explanatory power and were apparently com­
patible with the most divergent human behaviour, so that it was practi-
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cally impossible to describe any human behaviour that might not be 
claimed as verification for these theories (Popper, 1965:35, 36).
What the exact nature of the types of knowledge is that Popper juxtaposes 
to "science" by means of his demarcation criterion, is not very clear. 
That which is non-empirical or non-scientific includes non-science, 
pseudo-science, and metaphysics. Moreover, in his "Autobiography" 
Popper says that the problem was not so much a problem of demarcating 
science from metaphysics, but rather a problem of demarcating science 
from pseudo-science, which claims to find empirical verification for its 
statements, but refuses to indicate any conceivable circumstances in 
which theories would be refuted (1974:31). When he gives examples of 
pseudo-science he refers to Marx, Freud and Adler, whose views resemble 
astrology and myths! In order to demarcate these realms of knowledge 
from genuine science he formulates the criterion of demarcation, viz. 
testability, refutability or falsifiability (1965:256).
THE DEM ARCATION  BETWEEN D IFFEREN T  TYPES OF THEORY
When dealing with the status of science and metaphysics. Popper 
(1965:197) makes a distinction between three types of theory: Logical 
and mathematical theories; Empirical and scientific theories; and Philo­
sophical or metaphysical theories. The first group can be tested by 
critically examining two or more rival theories in order to refute either 
the one or the other and to make a decision about the truth or falsehood 
of a theory.
Refutation in the empirical sciences also takes place through critical ex­
amination. The only important difference here is that empirical arguments 
can also be used in this process . . . yet, "critical thought" remains the 
main instrument. Popper says that "Observations are used only if they 
fit into (our) critical d iscussion" (1965:197).
Philosophical theories can be examined critically even though they are 
irrefutable. Metaphysical statements fall outside the domain of science 
because they can in no way be falsified - whatever is allowed to be named 
"science" has to be tested severely (Popper, 1965:279).
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WHAT WOULD CO N ST IT U T E  SUCH A TEST ?
Popper argues that Logical positivism 's verifiability criterion of meaning 
was inappropiate because it not only excluded metaphysics, but also the 
most interesting of all scientific statements, the scientific theories - the 
universal laws of nature. These were no more reducible to observation 
reports than so-called "metaphysical pseudo-propositions" (Popper, 
1965:261:281).
According to Popper science proceeds by way of imaginative guesses - 
conjectures - that are then exposed to stringent testing in order to de­
termine whether these conjectures can be falsified. This potential for 
falsification (testability or refutability) was that which made a theory or 
statement scientific. It was its power to rule out or to exclude the oc­
currence of some possible events. He says that: " ... the more a theory 
forbids, the more it tells u s" (1974:31). This potential to be falsified, 
tested or refuted is the criterion Popper suggests as the demarcation 
criterion. He wants this criterion to be regarded as a proposal for an 
agreement or convention (1959:37). This process of testing is an inter- 
subjective process which forms a very important aspect of the idea of 
mutual rational control by critical discussion. This requirement of inter- 
subjective testability implies that there can be no ultimate statements in 
science which cannot be tested and in principle refuted (1959:47). Crucial 
experiments in science do not verify scientific theories, but falsify them 
(1965:112).
He acknowledges that scientific discovery is impossible without faith in 
ideas which are of a purely speculative kind, and sometimes even quite 
hazy; a faith which is completely unwarranted from the point of view of 
science and which is, to that extent "metaphysical". Yet, once it is re­
garded as science (or as an empirical theoretical system), it will have 
to satisfy the following three requirements: It must be synthetic, so that 
it may represent a non-contradictory, a possible world. It must satisfy 
the criterion of demarcation, i.e. it must not be metaphysical, but must 
represent a world of possible experience. It must be a system d istin­
guished in some way from other such systems as the one which represents 
our world of experience. Such a system is characterized by the fact that
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it has been submitted to and has stood up to severe tests (1965:279). 
"Experience" thus appears as a distinctive method whereby one theoretical 
system may be distinguised from others, so that empirical science is not 
only characterized by its logical form, but in addition by its distinctive 
method (1959:39).
IMM UNIZATION  AG A IN ST  REFUTATION
Popper soon realized that it was possible to immunize a theory against 
any possible form of falsification. Not all "forms of immunization, though, 
could be excluded. Some prove to be fruitful. They can stand up to 
testing to a certain extent and therefore the criterion of testability cannot 
be regarded as a very precise criterion. Because this is the case. Popper 
differentiates various types of theoretical systems on the basis of their 
relationship to testability (or falsifiability) and to immunization proce­
dures:
There are metaphysical theories of a pure existential character (1959:60). 
Theie are theories like the psycho-analytic theories of Freud, Adler and 
Jung or like astrological lore (pseudo-science?). There are unsophisti­
cated theories like "all swans are white" or the geocentric theory "All 
stars other than planets move in circles” . These theories are falsifiable, 
though falsification can always be evaded through immunization. Popper 
mentions the "case of Marxism" in a separate category. Initially it was 
classified under the pseudo-scientific and the metaphysical theories, later 
it proved that Marxism actually had been refutable. It was refuted by 
the course of historical events, but through reinterpretation (i.e. the 
theory of revolution) it became immunized and thus evades falsification. 
It is now irrefutablel (1965:37; Musgrave, 1968:82). The last category 
contains the more abstract theories like Newton or Einstein 's theories of 
gravitation. They are falsifiable, but this can be evaded through 
immunization or the introduction of auxiliary hypotheses. Popper's claim 
that these hypotheses are testable and add to the original empirical 
content of the theory, seems to contradict his statement that they are 
utilized in the process of immunization. This interpenetration of science 
by metaphysical ideas and science's apparent partial dependence on 
metaphysical notions for its existence raise the question concerning the 
relationship between science> and metaphysics.
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THE RELAT IO N SH IP  BETWEEN SC IEN C E  AND M ETAPH YSICS
Popper uses two models or metaphors to" illustrate his view on the re­
lationship between science and metaphysics:
In his discussion and rejection of the positivist’s criterion of the meaning 
of language, he uses the image of a square to demonstrate that 
metaphysics does not lie outside of the sphere of meaningful language. 
When it comes to science and metaphysics, he claims, they are both within 
the square. The line that separates them signifies the distinction between 
science (which is testable) and metaphysics (which is not) (1965:257). 
The second metaphor differs slightly, yet to my mind significantly from 
the first. In The Logic of Scientific D iscovery (1959:277) Popper argues 
that in order to obtain a picture or model of science, the various ideas 
and hypotheses might be visualized as particles suspended in a fluid 
(metaphysics). Testable science is the precipitation of these particles at 
the bottom of the vessel; they settle down in layers of universality. The 
thickness of the deposit grows with the number of these layers - every 
new layer corresponding to a theory more universal than those beneath 
it. As the result of this process, ideas previously floating in higher 
metaphysical regions may sometimes be reached by the growth of science 
and thus make contact with it and settle. Examples of such ideas are 
atomism, the idea of a single physical principle or ultimate element from 
which others derive, etc. A third argument concerning this relationship 
is found in Popper's discussion of Carnap 's criterion of meaning as a 
criterion of demarcation. Popper says that Carnap’s failure to overthrow 
metaphysics was the consequence of an ill-advised attempt to destroy 
metaphysics wholesale, instead of try ing to eliminate piecemeal, as it 
were, metaphysical elements from the various sciences, whenever this 
could be done without endangering scientific progress by misplaced 
criticism .
These images and arguments give rise to various questions: Is the 
separation between science and metaphysics as drastic as implied in the 
model of the square? If the intention of this model was only to make the 
point that metaphysical statements are meaningful, the second image (fluid 
and precipitating particles), presents another and not to illustrate the
-435-
demarcation thesis, then the second image raises the following problem: 
Must metaphysics be eliminated from science or not? The image creates 
the impression that the presence of the (metaphysical) fluid is necessary 
for the "precipitation process" of science to take place; a position de­
fended by Popper quite explicitly elsewhere. But why then is only a 
piecemeal elimination required, whereas a wholesale elimination of 
metaphysics is regarded as too radical? (1965:264). If all metaphysics is 
bad, then one would want to argue that a wholesale elimination was im­
perative. If science required metaphysics in order to develop and if this 
metaphysics contained both "good" and "bad" elements which were to be 
subjected to a piecemeal process of elimination of the "bad" metaphysics, 
one has only created another level ( that of metaphysics) where a c r i­
terion of demarcation is required. If other arguments of Popper are also 
taken into account, the final picture concerning the characterization of 
metaphysics and its relationship to science becomes even more confusing.
Popper acknowledges that metaphysical ideas do play an important role 
in the origin of science (1974:1067, 1183). Even mythological ideas have 
played such a role in the history of science (cf. Popper's reference to 
the role of Copernicus' Neo-Platonic views, 1965:187). These metaphysical 
notions, such as, for example, the unscientific faith in laws and regu­
larities, guide our guesses - the marvellously imaginative and bold con­
jectures or "anticipations" that are carefully and soberly controlled by 
systematic tests (1959:279, 314). On the other hand, we had already 
been warned against " ... those metaphysical systems which tend to 
bewitch and confuse u s" (Open society, 1966; vol. 2. 299).
GOOD AND BAD  M ETAPH YSIC S?
It becomes clear that we seem to need a second "criterion of demarcation"
- one that can distinguish between "good” and "bad" metaphysics! 
Popper does give us an important clue in this direction when he discusses 
the apparent irrefutability of philosophical systems such as determinism, 
idealism (and subjectivism), irrationalism and nihilism (1974:120 and 
19G5:194). Here he introduces the notion of rational and critical as­
sessment of these theories. They can be critically discussed within the
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context of a certain problem-situation which it purports to deal with. 
Every rational theory, no matter whether scientific or philosophical, is 
rational in so far as it tries to solve certain problems. It is compre­
hensible and reasonable only in its relation to a given problem-situation 
(1065:199). The setting of the problem-situation therefore determines 
the possibility of a critical and rational discussion of a problem. The 
solution of a philosophical problem, Popper claims, is never final. It 
cannot be based on a final proof or upon final refutation. This is a 
consequence of the irrefutability of scientific theories. A single comment 
in this respect would have to suffice:
Criticism and critical discussion presuppose some set of criteria that is 
being implemented in this process. When a philosophical theory is being 
discussed it at least presupposes an alternative philosophical perspective 
concerning the problem under discussion. The final arbiter in such a 
discussion is often reason,1 i.e. reason committed to a metaphysical 
perspective, or a theoretical framework. Popper would have to clarify 
the exact nature of metaphysical experience" over and against the "em­
pirical experience" which characterizes science. But he will also have to 
give a clearer account of the way in which empirical experience embedded 
in metaphysical frameworks can be rationally criticized by criteria which 
are in turn embedded in metaphysical frameworks. He would also have 
to explain how communication between these diverse perspectives is ac­
tually possible, given the differing sets of criteria being employed and 
the variety of assumptions from which problems are approached.
A PO SIT IV E  ROLE FOR M ET APH Y S IC S?
Apart from the already mentioned heuristic role Popper ascribes to in ­
fluential metaphysics (1959:38, 39), he also recognizes the significance
1 With apology to Kant and Wolterstorff!
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of a "metaphysical research programme" (Popper, 1974:175; note 242)2 
Such a metaphysical research programme provides a possible framework 
for testable scientific theories (1974:134). An example of such a 
programme is Darwinism. The value of such a programme for science is 
very great, because it may be criticized and improved. Popper s views 
on the role of metaphysics changed in the course of time, for he says 
that "Although when writing this book I was aware of holding 
metaphysical beliefs, and although I even pointed out the suggestive 
value of metaphysical ideas for science, I was not alive to the fact that 
some metaphysical doctrines were rationafiy arguable and, in spite of 
being irrefutable, criticizable" (1959:206, footnote 2).
Popper's view of metaphysics is certainly not clear and in some respects 
downright ambiguous. The criterion of demarcation at least, also needs 
to be applied to metaphysics. So we require not only a criterion of de­
marcation between science and metaphysics, but it also a criterion be­
tween "good" and "bad" metaphysics.
A SECOND C R ITER IO N  OF DEM ARCAT IO N ?
It gradually becomes clear that we do seem to need a second "criterion 
of demarcation" - one that can d istinguish between "good" and "bad" 
metaphysics! Popper does give us an important clue in this direction when 
he d iscusses the apparent irrefutability of philosophical systems such as 
determinism, idealism (and subjectivism), irrationalism and nihilism 
(1974:120 and 1965:194). Here he introduces the notion of rational and 
critical assessment of these theories. They can be critically discussed 
within the context of a certain problem-situation which they purport to 
deal with. Every rational theory, no matter whether scientific or philo­
sophical, is rational in so far as it tries to solve certain problems. It is 
comprehensible and reasonable only in its relation to a given 
problem-situation (1965:199). The setting of the problem-situation 
therefore determines the possibility of a critical and rational discussion
2 Lakatos' idea of "scientific research programmes" is modelled on this 
notion (1970:184).
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of a problem. The solution of a philosophical problem. Popper claims, is 
never final. It cannot be based on a final proof or upon final refutation. 
This is a consequence of the irrefutability of scientific theories.
Both Agassi (1975) and Lakatos (1970), students of Popper, seem to re­
gard the notion of metaphysics far more positively than Popper himself. 
Popper does acknowledge that metaphysical research programmes have 
influenced the development of science and claims that he proposes a new 
metaphysical view of the world and with a new research programme based 
on the idea of the reality of dispositions and on the propensity inter­
pretation of probability (1974:120).
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